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Abstract: 
This paper investigates whether Italian companies that cross-list in the United States 
between 1993 and 2005 show (i) a change in their internal policies as anticipated by the 
bonding hypothesis, (ii) an increase in market value, or (iii) an increase in the access to capital 
funds.  We use the unique environment created by the 1998 Draghi reform which significantly 
improved the protection of Italian listed companies’ minority shareholders and we further 
examine the impact of legislated changes in corporate governance in Italy on the decision of 
Italian companies to cross-list in the United States.   
Our results indicate that following the Draghi reform (i) firms that cross-list in the United 
States modify their dividend and cash policies as anticipated by the bonding hypothesis.  
Contrary to prior research, (ii) we do not find evidence that cross-listing serves to enhance 
shareholder value or (iii) is used as a vehicle to more easily access capital funds either before 
or after the domestic corporate governance is improved. 
The results of this study provide evidence that country level legislative innovations 
intended to enhance a weak corporate governance system can be a valid and effective 
substitute to the bonding mechanism by providing an alternative signal of a firm’s quality.   
 
Keywords: Italy, ADR, cross-listing, investor protection, regulation change, corporate 
governance, bonding hypothesis, signaling. 
Data availability: The data are available from public sources.  
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1.  Introduction1 
This paper investigates whether Italian companies that cross-list in the United States show 
(i) a change in their internal policies as anticipated by the bonding hypothesis, (ii) an increase 
in market value, or (iii) an increase in the access to capital funds.  We answer this question in 
both the weak corporate governance environment before the 1998 Draghi reform and also 
after this shareholder protection reform.  In this way we provide evidence of the impact of 
corporate governance reform on the behavior of firms cross-listed in the United States and 
eventual changes in their actions (cross-list vs. not cross-list) after the incentives to cross-
listing changed substantially.     
A foreign firm can cross-list its shares in the United States capital markets by either listing 
their shares directly on an exchange2 or by using the American Depository Receipts (ADRs) 
system.  ADRs are issued by custodian banks and trade on an organized exchange3, over the 
counter market, or on Portal.  Reese and Weisbach (2001) and Karolyi (2005) present a 
thorough explanation of the mechanics of cross-listing and we refer the reader to their 
manuscripts for further review of that process.  We include all forms of cross-listing of Italian 
firms in our sample (type I, II, and III ADRs) as the quality signaling benefits are roughly 
similar for all types, even if normative requirements are different.   
                                                 
1
 We would like to thank participants at the 4th Workshop on Accounting and Regulation - EIASM, Siena (Italy), 
AAA International Accounting Section 2007 Midyear Meeting – Charleston, SC, University of Tennessee, Ball 
State University, the University at Albany SUNY, and Mara Faccio (Purdue University) for their helpful 
comments and suggestions.  We also thank Bruce Behn and Ronald Shrieves for their guidance. All mistakes are 
our own. 
2
 This method is primarily used by Canadian and Israeli firms. 
3
 Including NYSE, Nasdaq, and AMEX. 
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Previous research analyzes groups of non-United States countries in order to identify 
cross-listing motivation and outcomes.  These studies find strong evidence that when firms 
cross-list: transactions costs decrease (Tinic and West 1974; Smith and Sofianos 1997; 
Domowitz et al. 1998; Foerster and Karolyi 1993, 1998); disclosure requirements increase 
resulting in higher stock prices (Cantale 1997; Fuerst 1998); and firm value increases, as 
measured by Tobin’s Q (Doidge et al. 2004).  However, previous research provides only weak 
evidence that foreign issuers cross-list in the United States in order to protect shareholder 
rights (Reese and Weisbach 2001).  Moreover, previous research provides mixed results 
regarding the effect of cross-listing on dividends, a component of shareholder value.  
Specifically, Jensen (1986) argues that managers have an incentive to lower dividends to 
retain resources within the company in order to support higher salaries, investment in risky 
projects and perquisite consumption.  La Porta and Lopez-De Silanes (2000) find that firms 
operating in countries with higher shareholder protection pay higher dividends than firms in 
countries with weaker shareholder protection.  These theories seem to indicate that dividends 
are mainly a “benefit” for minority shareholders and a “cost” for management and majority 
shareholders.  In contrast, Faccio et al. (2001) find that ex-ante firm value is lower in 
countries with weak shareholder protection, and for that reason higher dividends are required 
to offset the lower firm value.  One of the limitations inherent in this stream of research is 
that, to date, the authors use groups of countries, thereby averaging the differences among 
individual countries and exposing the results to the risk of a missing, correlated variable at the 
country level.   
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Our paper seeks to add to the existing literature by examining cross-listed firms from only 
one country.  This research design allows us to directly examine the effects of cross-listing 
without the confounding effects of averaging groups of countries with different economic, 
political, social, corporate governance, and legal environments.  In this way we are better able 
to evaluate the effects of cross-listing and of changes in corporate governance on the firms in 
our sample, with fewer confounding factors.  We chose Italy, specifically, because this 
country provides an excellent setting in which to examine our research questions.  Indeed, as 
several previous studies have indicated, the domestic Italian shareholder protection 
environment has been historically weak (La Porta et al. 1998; La Porta et al. 2000; Faccio and 
Lang 2002).  In 1998 the Draghi reform dramatically improved shareholder protection for 
domestically listed firms (Dyck and Zingales 2004).  This unique setting allows us to add to 
the existing literature by examining the change in cross-listing behavior and corporate policy 
decisions surrounding this significant legislated corporate governance reform. 
Our contribution to the literature is two-fold: first, we evaluate three different effects of 
cross-listing in the United States by a firm domiciled in a country with a weak corporate 
governance system without the confounding effects of the differences in the economic, 
political, social, corporate governance, and legal environments; second, we study the effects 
of the Italian corporate governance reform on the corporate decisions of listed firms.  The 
results can be helpful to other countries with weak corporate governance systems that are 
evaluating the possible benefits of legislating corporate governance reform.   
Research has shown that civil law countries, in general, have weaker corporate 
governance systems in the form of lower shareholder protection (La Porta et al. 2000).  
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Additionally, within the civil law countries, French civil law countries (including Italy) 
provide even less protection for minority shareholders (Reese and Weisbach 2001) than do 
other civil law countries.  Specifically, previous literature (La Porta et al. 1998) indicates that 
Italy, before the Draghi reform, was historically characterized by a low level of shareholder 
protection.  Hence, ex ante 1998, we argue that one of the incentives for Italian firms with 
high quality corporate governance to cross-list in the United States is the desire to signal to 
the market their own “high quality” by bonding to the legal system of a country with stronger 
shareholder protection laws.  To test this hypothesis we look at two indicators - the dividend 
ratio and cash balance to total assets ratio.  Previous literature (Zhang 2005) has adopted both 
ratios as proxies to measure the level of protection of minority shareholders.  The bonding 
hypothesis predicts that cross-listing firms, because they are bonded to a legal system where 
the protection of minority shareholders is stronger, can afford to pay lower dividends and 
maintain higher cash balances than non-cross-listed firms.  Our results provide support for 
this hypothesis.  Cross-listed firms in our sample pay lower dividends and maintain higher 
cash to total assets ratios than do the non-cross-listed firms, confirming that when the 
domestic corporate governance system is weak, bonding to a stronger corporate governance 
system allows companies to reduce dividends paid. 
However, following the 1998 corporate governance reform, the statistically significant 
difference in the dividends paid between cross-listed companies and non-cross-listed 
companies disappears.  This result, again, supports the bonding hypothesis: as the 
improvements in the domestic corporate governance system level the playing field, cross-
listed companies can no longer afford to pay lower dividends than do non-cross-listed 
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companies.  In contrast, the cash to total assets ratio (untabulated results) is still statistically 
different between cross-listing (higher) and non cross-listing (lower) companies after the 1998 
Draghi reform.  Overall, we can argue that one of the effects of the corporate governance 
reform in Italy was to eliminate the incentive for companies to signal their corporate 
governance quality by bonding to a legal system where shareholders’ rights were more 
strongly protected.   
Moreover, we use this unique regulatory change at a country level to test whether cross-
listed Italian companies were able to deliver to their shareholders a higher firm value - 
measured by both Tobin’s Q and the annual return on investment4 - than firms not cross-
listing.  We measure this effect both ex ante and ex post 1998.  Contrary to previous literature, 
our results do not indicate a consistent difference between firm valuations of cross-listed and 
non-cross-listed firms, nor do we find any difference in firm valuations before and after the 
Draghi reform.  Based on these results, Italian firms neither experience increases in firm value 
following cross-listing in the United States, nor following the legislated improvement in the 
local corporate governance system.  One likely reason for the differences in our results from 
other cross-country studies is that we examine cross-listing and corporate governance changes 
in only one country, with homogeneous country level factors, thus avoiding confounding 
effects that are difficult to disentangle and omitted correlated variables. 
 Lastly, we used this unique setting to test whether Italian companies that cross-list in the 
United States experienced an easier access to capital funds than companies that do not cross-
list.  In order to test this hypothesis, we examined the increases in the number of outstanding 
                                                 
4
 We calculate return on investment both with and without dividends with the same results. 
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shares before and after the cross-listing event, as well as ex ante and ex post the 1998 Draghi 
reform.  Contrary to prior literature, our results indicate that there is no difference in the year 
over year change in shares outstanding for cross-listed firms versus non-cross-listed firms.  
There also appears to be no difference in the year over year change in the shares outstanding 
for firms before the 1998 corporate governance reform and after the reform.  These results 
indicate that companies do not appear to cross-list in the United States in order to gain access 
to capital investors either before or after the 1998 corporate governance reform.  Again, our 
results may differ from other studies because we examine data from one country, eliminating 
other country level confounding factors.   
Overall, the results of our study indicate that countries with weak corporate governance 
systems can use legislation to improve shareholder protection and thus reduce the incentives 
for local firms to cross-list in the United States in order to signal their quality as anticipated 
by the bonding hypothesis.  We find no evidence that Italian firms, cross-listing in the United 
States, enhance their shareholder value or issue more stock.  These results are particularly 
meaningful to legislators because they indicate that a government can take action to improve 
domestic corporate governance and thereby reduce the cross-listing incentives for domestic 
firms.  Additionally, firms that are domiciled in countries that introduce a stronger corporate 
governance system may be able to avoid the costs of cross-listing.  We leave it to future 
research to determine if the costs of cross-listing are exceeded by the costs of compliance with 
the changes implemented under the Draghi reform. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents a review of the 
relevant previous literature.  Section 3 includes the exposition and argumentation of our 
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hypotheses.  Section 4 describes our sample and data.  Section 5 presents our empirical results 
and Section 6 summarizes our conclusions and offers suggestions for future research.   
 
2.  Review of previous literature 
2.1 Separation of ownership and control literature 
Berle and Means (1932), and Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that the separation 
between ownership and control of a company results in agency conflicts between owners 
(shareholders) and agents (management).  The root of the agency problem is the ability of 
management to make decisions that benefit themselves at the cost of shareholders, while 
shareholders are not able to completely monitor the actions and performance of management.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that the presence of large shareholders may offer a partial 
solution to the agency problem as large shareholders would have both the motivation and 
ability to monitor management, thus enhancing firm efficiency through the reduction of 
agency costs. 
However, in addition to the positive effect of reduced agency costs, large or dominant 
shareholders can also create the negative consequence known as the entrenchment effect;  
Dyck and Zingales (2004, 2002), suggest that large shareholders are able to divert corporate 
resources from other (minority) shareholders through self dealing (i.e. purchase and sale of 
assets are common examples of self-dealing) or tunneling (transferring resources out of the 
company) (Johnson et al. 2000).  These authors offer evidence that Italy is an excellent 
example of a legal environment in which, before the Draghi reform, minority shareholders’ 
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rights were only weakly protected, resulting in obvious instances of expropriation of minority 
shareholders by majority shareholders5.  
Previous research has documented the existence of control chains and pyramid structures6 
as tools for dominant shareholders to achieve control (voting) rights larger than their 
ownership (cash flow) rights7.  These control rights can be used to dominate a firm to a 
greater extent than is justified by direct ownership.  Shleifer and Vishny (1986) identify 
several methods used by managers and dominant shareholders to expropriate company 
resources from minority shareholders: excessive management salaries, perquisite 
consumption, extra dividends to certain share classes, self dealing, tunneling, and outright 
theft.  These types of expropriation by dominant shareholders are possible because in these 
companies, either directly or indirectly, the dominant shareholder controls the firm’s board of 
directors (Dahya et al. 2005).  Previous research has repeatedly indicated that in the absence 
of strong shareholder protection, management and dominant shareholders each have both the 
                                                 
5
 Johnson et al. (2000) present an Italian company where the dominant shareholders successfully expropriated 
wealth from the minority shareholders.  Anguissola and Mignani, are minority shareholders of Marcilli, an 
Italian machinery maker. The controlling shareholder of the company is Sarcem, a Swiss machinery maker, who 
owns 51% of Marcilli. Sarcem precluded Marcilli from directly exporting its products, charged a very high 
markup for Marcilli products it sold, and sold Marcilli products under its own trademark, overcharging Marcilli.  
The court declined to appoint a judicial investigation because Marcilli’s president had duty of care to Sarcem, 
the controlling shareholder.   This case illustrates the risks borne by minority shareholders of Italian companies 
before the Draghi reform.   
6 Pyramid structures are defined as follows.  Firm Y is said to be controlled through pyramiding if it has an 
ultimate owner who controls Y indirectly through another corporation that it does not wholly control. For 
example, if a family owns 15% of Firm X (which owns 20% of Firm Y), then Firm Y is controlled through a 
pyramid at the 10% threshold.  However, at the 20% threshold, we would say that Firm Y is directly controlled 
by Firm X (which is widely held at the 20% threshold) and no pyramiding would be recorded. If Firm X holds 
100% of Firm Y, then again there is no pyramid.  Cross holding structures are defined as follows.  Cross 
holdings: Firm Y is controlled by a cross-holding at the 10% (or 20%) threshold if Firm X holds a stake in Firm 
Y of at least  10% (or 20%), and Y holds a stake in Firm X of at least  10% (or 20%), or if firm Y directly holds 
at least  10% (or 20%) of its own stock.  
7
 Control rights are measured by voting rights a shareholder can exercise in a shareholders’ meeting, while the 
cash flow rights are equal to the equity share owned by the shareholder.  
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motivation and the ability to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders (La Porta et al. 
2000; Faccio et al. 2001; Johnson et al. 2000; Claessens et al. 2002). 
Faccio (2002) identified a pattern of significant differences between dominant shareholder 
voting rights and cash flow rights in five Western European countries including Italy (as well 
as Belgium, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland).  These differences signify an increased risk 
of loss-of-value to minority shareholders. 
 
2.2 Dividend Policy literature 
Existing literature (Faccio et al. 2001; La Porta and Lopez-De-Silanes 2000; Jensen 1986) 
offers mixed results regarding the effect of the excess control of large dominant shareholders 
over dividend policies.   In general there are two views: the country-level view and the firm-
level view.   
At a country level, Jensen (1986) argues that managers may use lower dividend payments 
to retain resources that can be employed for perquisite consumption, excess salaries, or 
projects that benefit managers or increase private benefit of control for dominant shareholders 
at the expense of the other shareholders. Higher dividend payments, indeed, force firms to 
raise the funds they need from capital markets, who then may become a monitoring 
mechanism over managers and controlling shareholders.  Dominant owners with higher 
control (voting) rights than cash flow (ownership) rights have an interest in paying lower 
dividends, since they receive only a small fraction of the paid dividends.  Similarly, at a 
country level, La Porta and Lopez-De-Silanes (2000)  provide evidence that firms in countries 
with stronger shareholder protection pay higher dividends.   
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At a firm level, the bonding hypothesis suggests that investors discount ex ante the value 
of the firm due to agency concerns and the resulting higher risk to minority shareholders. 
Companies, however, can counter these concerns by bonding themselves to a stronger 
shareholder environment and thereby reducing the agency costs anticipated by minority 
shareholders.  In this way, if agency costs between controlling and minority shareholders are 
reduced by cross-listing in the United States, a cross-listed company can lower its dividend 
payments.  Faccio et al. (2001) offer both theory and empirical evidence regarding the 
bonding hypothesis and its effect on firms’ dividend policy. Specifically, they find a positive 
association between the excess control held by the dominant shareholders and dividend 
payment.  These authors argue that investors associate dominant shareholders with higher 
agency costs and therefore discount the value of the firm ex ante.  To make up for this 
perceived lower firm value, companies distribute higher dividends, as a bonding device.   
We expect the firm level results to be relevant to our study as all of our firms are from 
one country, Italy, thus eliminating the country-level effects that were present in other studies.   
 
2.3 Cross-listing literature 
In the last ten years the number of companies that cross-list their shares in the United 
States market has increased tenfold8, with a peak in 1996 and a downturn at the beginning of 
this decade coinciding with regulatory changes9 that have made listing in the US less 
attractive (Zhu et al. 2007).  Finance, accounting, and legal literature provide different 
                                                 
8
 Non-U.S. companies listing or issuing their shares on the United States market through the American 
Depository Receipts (ADR) program went from 158 in the early ’90 to 2172 at July 2007 (data from Bank of 
New York ADR website: www. adrbny.com). 
9
 US Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on July 30, 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745). 
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explanations and suggest different relevant factors for the development of the cross-listing 
activity.  
Biddle and Saudagaran (1991) identify both the costs and benefits of listing on a foreign 
stock exchange. They identify several financial benefits to cross-listing including: a reduction 
in the firm’s cost of capital, lower transaction costs, lower systematic risk, and lower required 
rate of return by investors. Moreover, companies listing on a foreign stock exchange gain 
marketing, public relations, and political benefits. The costs include the accounting and 
regulatory costs of foreign listing, specifically: compliance with foreign accounting reporting 
requirements (in the United States, generally accepted accounting principles or GAAP), 
modification of auditing procedures, changing the frequency of financial reporting, increasing 
financial disclosure10, and the upfront costs of the initial registration.  
The market segmentation hypothesis emphasizes that world markets are separated by 
cultural, financial, legal, language, and fiscal barriers. Capital market integration theories 
(Alexander et al. 1987) argue that removing those barriers would help to share the risk among 
investors, thereby reducing the expected returns demanded by investors and the transaction 
costs, while increasing the stock prices. Non-United States companies can remove these 
investment barriers by cross-listing on a United States exchange.  Indeed, empirical research 
has found a significant decrease in the cost of capital for cross-listing companies (Errunza and 
Miller 2000).  
                                                 
10
 Licht (2003) notes that in the United States, current reporting rules require that companies disclose potentially 
sensitive information such as remuneration, related party transaction, stock-option data, and names of 
shareholders with more than 5% of the issuer’s voting securities. These rules can reduce managers’ control and 
financial and non-financial benefits.  
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Some other researchers suggest increased liquidity as another explanation for the decision 
to cross-list. The United States market is more liquid, and thus can alleviate capital constraints 
that may exist in a domestic market thereby making capital available to firms at a lower cost.  
In a single-country study, Davis-Friday (2005) provides evidence that Mexican companies 
cross-listed in the United States in order to overcome the capital constraints that existed in 
Mexico following the devaluation of that currency in 1995.  
Another stream of research in the law and finance disciplines, defines the bonding 
hypothesis as a motivation for cross-listing in order to signal the “quality” of a firm.  Where 
the legal protection of minority shareholders is weak, it is more difficult for companies to 
raise external capital (La Porta et al. 1997).  To alleviate this problem, firms that desire 
external capital can bond themselves to a higher investor protection system by cross-listing 
their shares in the United States, because of mandatory high quality disclosure requirements, 
SEC enforcement actions, and shareholder litigation law, all of which make expropriation of 
minority shareholders by dominant shareholders and/or by management more difficult 
(Coffee 1999).  Empirical research has consistently supported the bonding hypothesis.  
Doidge et al. (2004) provide evidence that at the end of 1997, foreign companies with shares 
cross-listed on major United States exchanges have Tobin’s Q ratios significantly higher than 
companies that do not cross-list.  These authors suggest that cross-listing in the United States 
reduces the opportunities for dominant shareholders and management to expropriate private 
benefits, thereby enhancing the value of the firm.  This effect is more pronounced for firms 
that are based in countries with weaker investor protection laws.   
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Within this line of research, analytical models consider the decision to cross-list as both a 
signal from dominant shareholders and managers of private information about their firm’s 
“quality” to outside investors, and as an action designed to bond the firm to a higher quality 
disclosure environment.  
Pagano, Roell, and Zechner (2002) examine the motivation of European companies’ to 
cross-list, relating the cross-listing decision to the characteristics of the destination exchanges 
(and countries) relative to those of the home exchange (and country).  They find that 
European companies appear more likely to cross-list in more liquid or larger markets, and in 
markets in which several companies from their industry already cross-list. They also find a 
higher likelihood of cross-listing in countries with stronger investor protection, and more 
efficient courts and bureaucracy, but not with more stringent accounting standards.  
Moreover, they suggest that a United States listing is a natural choice for high-growth and 
high-tech companies, while European exchanges are chosen by companies with a strong 
historical record of profitability.  
Previous research has provided only weak evidence of equity increases following cross-
listings when examining groups of foreign companies (Reese and Weisbach 2001).  
 
2.4 Country Background 
Italy has historically had one of the weakest shareholder legal protection environments 
among the world’s industrialized countries. In the well known study by La Porta et al. (1998), 
Italy emerged with an antidirector rights score equal to 1 (in a scale from 1 to 6).  In 1998 
Italy went through a radical corporate governance reform, also known as the Draghi reform. 
  
16 
Among new regulations, this reform made it easier for minority shareholders to sue the 
company’s management11.  Furthermore, to reduce the asymmetry between cash flow and 
voting rights, this reform made it mandatory for anyone who acquires 30% or more of the 
voting shares of a listed company to bid for 100% of the shares.  Before the reform, 
shareholders representing at least 20% of the equity issued could ask for a shareholders 
meeting; after the reform, the threshold was lowered to 10% (or less, if the by-laws state a 
lower amount).  The same percentages are required for shareholders’ proposals at the meeting.   
Overall, this reform significantly improved the corporate governance of Italian firms 
specifically related to minority shareholder rights and protections. 
One of the expected consequences of this reform was to limit the ability of dominant 
shareholders to extract private benefits from the company.  Despite the effort to avoid the new 
rules whenever possible 12, there is evidence that the 1998 Draghi reform was able to deliver 
the desired results: Dyck and Zingales (2004) found that before 1998 the average value of 
private benefits13 of control for dominant shareholders in listed Italian companies was 47 
percent, while after 1998 it was reduced to a mere 6 percent.   
 
                                                 
11
 Until 1998, individual and minority shareholders were not allowed to sue the directors for damages suffered 
by the company. After the reform, a minority representing at least 5% of the total issued equity in a listed 
company can start a derivative suit against the company’s directors.  
 
12
 In Pirelli Spa, the controlling stake was reduced from 50 percent to around 30 percent. In the disperse 
ownership cases of Olivetti and SNIA-BPD, coalitions of shareholders worked together to create controlling 
stakes just below 30 percent. (Bianchi et al. 1998) 
13
  They use the Barclay and Holderness (1989) method to infer the value of private benefits of control for 39 
countries. When a control block exchanges hands, they measure the difference between the price paid by the 
acquirer and the price quoted on the market the day after the sale’s announcement. This difference is called 
control premium and is used to measure the private benefits of controlling the company.  
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3.  Hypotheses development 
Our basic research question examines which, if any, of the following motivations for 
Italian firms to cross-list in the United States are supported by the data:  bonding a weak 
shareholder protection environment to a stronger legal protection environment, the desire to 
increase shareholder value, or the desire to more easily access equity capital. 
Previous literature clearly identifies the United States legal environment as one that 
provides strong legal protection to minority shareholders.  For this reason, we consider the 
decision to cross-list in the United States as a proxy for the decision to bond a company to a 
stronger shareholder protection environment.  Moreover, researchers arguing in favor of the 
bonding hypothesis,  provided evidence that dividends paid, at the firm-level, are lower after 
cross-listing (Faccio et al. 2001).  In this paper we analyze data at the firm-level, within the 
same country, and therefore expect the effects of cross-listing on a company’s dividend policy 
to conform to the bonding hypothesis.  In the same way, previous literature provides evidence 
that firm-level cash holdings are negatively correlated with the degree of legal protection of 
minority shareholders (Dittmar et al. 2003), and thus are also correlated with the firm’s cross-
listing decisions.  This literature leads us to Hypothesis 1a: 
 
H1a: (alternative form) Bonding to a stronger shareholder protection environment (cross-
listing in the United States) results in lower dividends paid to investors and a higher cash 
balance to total assets ratio.  
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Since the enactment of the Draghi reform in 1998, the corporate governance system, 
specifically, the legal protection of minority shareholders rights, in Italy has improved (Dyck 
and Zingales 2004). Hence, as previous literature suggests (Jensen 1986; Zhang 2005; La 
Porta and Lopez-De-Silanes 2000), we would expect an increase in dividend payments to 
investors and a lower level of cash holdings after 1998, ceteris paribus.  Hypothesis 1b is as 
follows: 
 
H1b: (alternate form) Following the Draghi reform, all companies in the sample will pay 
higher dividends to investors and have a lower cash balance to total assets ratio due to 
the improved domestic shareholder protection setting in Italy.  
 
We also test the combined effect of the decision to cross-list in the United States and the 
Draghi reform on the dividend policy and cash balances of Italian companies in order to 
determine if the benefits offered by bonding is greater than (or less than) the corporate 
governance improvement in Italy subsequent to the 1998 Draghi reform.  Hypothesis 1c is as 
follows: 
  
H1c: (alternate form) Bonding to a stronger shareholder protection environment (cross-
listing in the United States) after the Draghi Reform results in higher/lower dividends 
paid to investors and higher/lower cash balance to total assets ratios for both cross-listed 
and non-cross-listed firms. 
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Additionally, based on results provided by extant literature (La Porta et al. 2002; Doidge 
et al. 2004), we expect the market value of the company, measured by Tobin’s Q and returns 
to investors (excluding dividends), to be higher for cross-listed companies.  Tobin’s Q 
measures the market value per dollar of replacement costs of tangible assets, while the return 
to investors measures the annual increase in the market price of a company’s shares 
(excluding dividends). Assuming rational and efficient financial markets, stock prices 
incorporate all positive and negative news about the company’s expected future cash flows, 
including the decision to cross-list.  We state these Hypotheses in 2a, b and c: 
 
H2a: (alternate form) Bonding to a stronger shareholder protection environment (cross-
listing in the United States) results in higher firm market value as measured by returns to 
investors and Tobin’s Q. 
 
H2b: (alternate form) Following the Draghi reform all companies in the sample 
experience higher firm market value as measured by returns to investors and Tobin’s Q. 
 
H2c: (alternate form) Bonding to a stronger shareholder protection environment (cross-
listing in the United States) after the Draghi Reform result in increased firm market value 
as measured by returns to investors and Tobin’s Q for cross-listed firms as compared to 
non-cross-listed firms. 
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Another motivation for cross-listing in the United States is easier access to capital 
funding.  Previous research indicates that separate from the above motivations for cross-
listing, firms that cross-list subsequently increase equity issues, regardless of the shareholder 
protection environment (Reese and Weisbach 2001).  Based on these results, we expect cross-
listed firms to show a greater year over year increase in the number of shares outstanding than 
do non-cross-listed firms.  We further expect that the relation will continue following the 
Draghi reform.  We will additionally test if the respective increase in shares outstanding is 
different between cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms after the Draghi reform although 
previous research does not offer us directional guidance for this hypothesis.  We test these 
Hypotheses in 3a, 3b and 3c below: 
 
H3a: (alternate form) Bonding to a stronger shareholder protection environment (cross-
listing in the United States) results in increases in the year over year shares outstanding 
(as compared to non-cross-listed firms). 
 
H3b: (alternate form) Following the Draghi reform, all firms in the sample 
increase/decrease year over year the number of shares outstanding. 
 
H3c: (alternate form) Bonding to a stronger shareholder protection environment (cross-
listing in the United States) after the Draghi Reform increases/decreases year over year  
the number of shares outstanding. 
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4.  Sample Selection and Data 
4.1 Sample selection 
We gathered financial and accounting data from the Global Vantage (Compustat) database 
and ADR data from Citibank American Depositary Receipt Services14, Bank of New York 
ADR website15 and JP Morgan ADR website16.  As of October, 2006, 46 Italian ADRs were 
listed on the Citibank American Depositary Receipt Services website.  Table 1 lists all of the 
Italian firms cross-listed in the United States.  It is important to note that while Table 1 lists 
different classes of shares of the same company as different ADRs programs (i.e., FIAT 
S.P.A. cross-lists 3 different ADR programs),17 to avoid the violation of the assumptions of 
the OLS regression model, the sample used to estimate our OLS regressions includes only one 
ADR program for each company-year.   
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 lists the capital raising events for all of the Italian firms cross-listed in the 
United States.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
For our sample period, 1993 to 2005, we include all ADRs for which data are 
available on Global Vantage (Global Issue and Global Commercial/Industrial). Our 
dataset includes a total of 2,365 firm-year observations.     
                                                 
14
 http://wwss.citissb.com/adr/scripts/uig/pgm_s.asp 
15http://www.adrbny.com 
16http:// www.adr.com 
17
 Each class of share assigns to the shareholder different voting and cash flow rights (similarly to class A and B 
shares in the U.S.). 
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To test our first group of hypotheses, we use the ratio of total dividend payments to total 
assets at the beginning of the period to quantify a firm’s dividend policy (Zhang 2005). We 
also examine each firm’s cash holding policy as a dependent variable proxied by the log of 
the cash ratio, measured as the sum of cash and cash equivalents divided by net assets.18  
In our second group of hypotheses, we analyze the effect of cross-listing on firm value 
and firm performance.  As a proxy for firm value we use the simplified version of Tobin’s Q 
originally developed by Kaplan and Zingales (1997)19.  To minimize the effects of outliers in 
the regression analysis, we perform the same analyses winsorizing all of the financial 
variables at 1% and 99%. Our (untabulated) results are consistent both with and without 
winsorizing our variables.   
Finally, in order to make shares and stock prices directly comparable through time20, we 
use Cumulative Adjustment Factors (CAF) from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS).  
We calculate adjusted stock price and adjusted shares outstanding by multiplying numbers 
from the Global Vantage Global Issue database with the CAF provided by WRDS.  We then 
calculate the value of returns to investors (with and without dividends), market value, and 
Tobin’s Q based on those adjusted observation.  Results (untabulated) of the additional 
analyses are the same as the unadjusted values.  
 
                                                 
18
 Net assets is computed as the difference between total assets and cash plus cash equivalents. 
19
 Tobin’s Q is defined as a firm’s market value per dollar of replacement costs of tangible assets.  The higher a 
firm’s Tobin’s Q, the higher the market value of each dollar of replacement cost of tangible assets (or, more 
simply, each dollar of total assets).  The original Tobin’s Q model is calculated as the ratio: "market value of the 
firm" over "the reproduction cost of its assets.”  There are some papers that use a more simplified procedure in 
which Tobin’s Q is equal to the market value of assets divided by the book value of total assets.  Market value of 
assets is calculated as the book value of assets plus the market value of common stock (total shares outstanding 
multiplied by the price per share outstanding) less the sum of book value of common equity.   
20
 In this way we adjust for stock splits and other events that affect the firm’s capital structure. 
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4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 presents summary statistics for all of the accounting and financial variables for 
our complete sample, and separately for companies with cross-listings in the United States 
and for those companies without cross-listings.  Results indicate that cross-listed companies 
compared with non-cross-listed companies have, on average, higher sales volume (12.8 vs. 
2.2 billion euro), net income (145.0 vs. 60.4 million euro), current assets (9.7 vs. 1.7 billion 
euro), goodwill (1.9 vs. 0.3 billion euro), retained earnings (258.0 vs. 85.0 million euro), and 
market value (5.0 vs. 1.2 billion euro).  However, cross-listed companies are characterized by 
a lower growth rate (0.12 vs. 0.47), Tobin’s Q value (1.22 vs. 1.52), and dividend ratio 
(0.0052 vs. 0.0081).  No correlation or collinearity problems were identified. 
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here] 
 
4.3 Research Design 
We use several statistical analyses to test our hypotheses.  First, we perform two simple 
univariate analyses to test if the means and medians of the dependent variables for the 
complete sample (1) before and (2) after the 1998 reform and for companies (1) that were 
cross-listed and (2) those that were not cross-listed are significantly different.  Second, we run 
OLS regressions to test the hypotheses, controlling for other variables that previous literature 
has found relevant in explaining the cross-listing decisions.  Previous literature, for instance, 
identifies one of the possible reasons to cross-list in a more liquid market is a need to access 
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financial capital (Pagano et al. 2002).  For this reason, in our model we control for companies 
with high growth opportunities by including the Growth independent variable in our models21.  
 
 
4.3.1 Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables in the model are the dividend ratio, cash holdings ratio, leverage, 
returns to investors with and without dividends, Tobin’s Q, and the year over year increase in 
the number of shares outstanding. 
We define the dividend ratio as the ratio of total dividend payments divided by total 
assets.  We calculate the cash holding ratio as the sum of cash and cash equivalents divided by 
net assets.  Net assets are computed as the total assets less cash and cash equivalents.  
Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets.  
We compute the actual return to investors with dividends as: 
1
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+−
=
t
ttt
t P
DivPP
                                                                                                             (1) 
where Rett  is the return to investors at time t, tP is the price of the stock at time t, and tDiv  is 
the dividend per share at time t.  Returns without dividends are calculated as:  
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We compute the Tobin’s Q as the ratio of the sum of total book value of debt plus the 
market value of equity over the total book value of assets.  Finally, we calculate the year over 
                                                 
21
 The growth ratio is calculated as the increase in sales between year t-1 and t, divided by total sales for year t-1. 
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year increase in shares outstanding as the difference between shares outstanding in year t and 
in year t-1, adjusting the value to take into account stock splits and other events that affect the 
firm’s capital structure. 
 
5.  Empirical results 
Our univariate results from examining the dependent variables before and after the 1998 
corporate governance reform show that, on average, the dividend ratio is statistically higher 
before the reform, while the value of the Tobin’s Q is statistically lower.  The return to 
investors without dividends is, is not statistically significantly different before the reform 
versus after the reform.   
Our univariate results from examining the dependent variables for firms that cross-listed 
in the United States versus firms that did not cross-list shows that companies that cross-list are 
characterized, on average, by a lower dividend ratio.  There is no significant difference in the 
returns without dividends and Tobin’s Q between the two groups. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Our multivariate regressions allow us to test our hypotheses while controlling for certain 
variables that previous research has found relevant in explaining the decision to cross-list in 
the United States.  We use the following model to test our hypotheses (firm and time 
subscripts are omitted for simplicity): 
 
98*Re
98
98765
43210
AfterSCrossListUSCrossListUTobinQMktValtEarEU
GoodEUCaEUAfterGrowthNetIncEUDependent
βββββ
βββββα
++++
++++++=
             (3) 
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where the dependent variable (defined at Table 6) Dependent varies for different models.  
Dependent is equal to Divratio in model (1), LogCashRatio in model (2), Leverage in model 
(3), TobinQ in model (4), Retwithout in model (5), MktVal in model (6), and Diffshare in 
model (7).  Divratio is dividend ratio, calculated as the ratio of total dividend payments to 
total assets.  LogCashRatio is the log of the ratio of total cash to total assets minus cash.  
Leverage is calculated as total liabilities divided by total assets.  TobinQ is equal to the market 
value of assets divided by the book value of total assets, where market value of assets is 
calculated as the book value of assets plus the market value of common stock (total shares 
outstanding multiplied by the value of shares outstanding) less the sum of the book value of 
common equity.  Untabulated results show qualitatively similar results for the value of 
TobinQ where the variable was not winsorized.  RetWithout is the returns to investors without 
dividends (computed as Retwithout=(Pt/Pt-1)-1).  Untabulated results show qualitatively 
similar results if we adopt returns to investors including dividends.  MktVal is equal to the 
total shares outstanding times the price of a share on the market at the end of the year (in 
euro).  Diffshare is the difference in the number of shares outstanding between year t and year 
t-1 for company i.  NetIncEU is net income in euro.  Growth is calculated as the increase in 
sales between year t-1 and t, divided by total sales for year t-1.  CrossListUS is a indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the shares of the company are listed on a United States stock exchange, 0 
otherwise.  CaEU is current assets in euro.  GoodEU is goodwill in euro.  RetEarEU is 
retained earnings in euro.   
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We test Hypothesis 1 with the first and the second models, Hypothesis 2 with the fourth 
and fifth model, and Hypothesis 3 with the sixth and the seventh model.  Model 3 helps to 
clarify if the reform and/or the cross-listing on the United States market are associated with a 
change in the company financing policies, and an increase in the importance of equity 
financing over debt financing, or vice-versa. 
In Model 1, the dependent variable is the company’s dividend ratio (results in Table 6 
Column 1) and we expect to find a negative coefficient, β8, for the CrossListUS indicator 
variable and a positive coefficient, β2, for the After98 indicator variable, confirming the 
bonding hypothesis described above.  We do not have an expectation for the sign of the 
coefficient of the interaction variable, β9, since the sign depends on which of the two effects, 
the cross-listing or the reform effect, is dominant.  Our results show that there is a significant 
and negative coefficient estimate for β9 (-0.006, t value of 2.80), while β2 is not statistically 
different from zero.  In accordance with the bonding hypothesis, our results indicate that 
companies reduce their dividends paid to shareholders after the cross-listing event, but they 
do not change their dividend policy after the 1998 reform.   
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Model 2 tests if the company’s cash policy is affected by either the cross-listing of shares 
on the United States market or by the corporate governance reform.  We expect results 
consistent with the bonding hypothesis explained above: a positive coefficient estimate for the 
CrossListUS indicator variable (β8) and a negative coefficient for the After98 indicator 
variable (β2).  Under the bonding hypothesis, companies bonded to a stronger shareholder 
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legal environment can distribute lower dividends without concern that investors will discount 
their firm’s value on the market due to agency conflicts between majority and minority 
shareholders.  Model 2 results (Table 6, Column 2) show that both of the coefficients of 
interest are statistically significant and have the expected signs, thereby providing evidence in 
support of the bonding hypothesis.  In both Model 1 and Model 2 estimates for the interaction 
term (β9) is not statistically different from zero, indicating that after the 1998 reform there is 
no significant incremental difference in dividends paid or cash holding policies between 
companies cross-listed in the United States and the rest of the companies in the sample.  As a 
result, the cash to total assets ratio of cross-listed firms remains higher than that of non-cross-
listed firms even after the 1998 Draghi reform (untabulated results). 
Overall the results for Hypotheses 1a, 1b and 1c indicate that companies that cross-list 
their shares in the United States have significantly lower dividends and higher cash holdings 
than non-cross-listing companies.  These results are consistent for the whole sample and 
whether we restrict the sample to either pre-1998 data or to post-1998 data.   
Hypothesis 2 (Models 4 and 5) tests the market reaction (measured with returns to 
investors and with Tobin’s Q) to both the 1998 reform and to cross-listing by the company on 
the United States market.  We expect a positive reaction from the market to both of these 
events, resulting in higher share prices and higher returns to investors and higher Tobin’s Q 
values for firms that cross-list in the United States and for all firms following the 1998 
corporate governance reform.  
However, results for Hypotheses 2a, 2b and 2c (Table 6, Columns 4 and 5) indicate that 
from the market’s point of view, there is no statistical evidence that cross-listing in the United 
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States results in higher firm value.  The only statistically significant coefficient estimate for 
these models is a positive value (0.286, t value of 8.25) for β2 in Model 4 indicating that 
Italian companies, on average, experienced an increase in their Tobin’s Q values after the 
1998 Draghi reform.  Contrary to previous research, (Doidge et al. 2004), our results do not 
show an increase a firm’s Tobin’s Q value after cross-listing in the United States (coefficient 
β8 is not statistically different from zero).  Our results may be different from prior studies 
because the number of Italian companies who cross-list in the United States has increased 
over time during the period used in our sample, and ignoring the effect of the Draghi reform 
on a company’s Tobin’s Q value might lead to the conclusion that the increase in Tobin’s Q is 
due to the cross-listing decision.  Additionally, as mentioned earlier, other studies in this area 
have included companies from many countries and failing to control for fundamental 
institutional changes could lead to different results.  
Hypotheses 3a, 3b and 3c, test another possible explanation for the decision to cross-list in 
the United States.  Specifically, we examine whether Italian companies decide to cross-list 
because they are looking to raise equity capital and they need a capital market more liquid 
than their domestic market.  We estimate Model (6) to evaluate whether companies increase 
their market value and Model (7) to evaluate whether companies increase the number of 
shares outstanding following the Draghi reform and/or the cross-listing events.  Our results 
presented in Table 6, Columns 6 and 7 provide evidence that companies in the sample 
decrease the number of shares outstanding after the 1998 Draghi reform (the coefficient β2 
estimate for Model (7) is equal to –40.129, t value of 1.94), while the data show no changes 
either in the market value or in the number of shares outstanding before/after the cross-listing.  
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Overall, these results indicate that Italian firms are not increasing their shares outstanding as 
would be expected if companies cross-list in order to gain access to a more liquid capital 
market. 
Lastly, our results for Model (3), where the dependent variable is the leverage ratio of the 
company, confirm that there is no change in the source of company financing associated with 
the two events considered in the paper (indeed, the estimates of the coefficients of interest, β2 
and
 
β8, are not statistically different from zero).  Companies do not switch from debt financing 
to equity financing, or vice-versa, after either a cross-listing event or the 1998 Draghi reform.  
Results for Model (3), together with evidence in support of Hypothesis 3, show that Italian 
companies in the sample do not cross-list in the United States market to raise equity capital; 
indeed, (i) the number of shares outstanding, (ii) the market value calculated as the number of 
shares outstanding times the price on the market, (iii) and the ratio of total liabilities to total 
assets do not change, on average, after the cross-listing.   
Our overall results show that once we take into consideration the institutional reform 
introduced in 1998, there is no evidence of an increase in the company’s market value or in 
the value delivered to investors, nor is there evidence that companies, on average, cross-list 
their shares in the United States market to raise more capital.  However, our results do 
confirm the bonding hypothesis as the explanation for cross-listing a firm’s shares in the 
capital market of a country characterized by higher shareholder protection in order to show 
investors the company’s commitment to voluntarily enforce policies more favorable to the 
interests of minority shareholders.  
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5.1 Further Analyses 
In conclusion, we provide two additional empirical results that help to corroborate our 
findings.  First, we evaluated whether the 1998 Draghi reform makes a difference in the 
decision to cross-list Italian firm’s shares on the US market.  For this analysis, we compare 
the number and the value of shares of Italian companies exchanged in the US market from 
1991 to 2005 with the number and value of shares exchanged on the US market for companies 
from other Western Europe countries.  
[Insert Graph 1 about here] 
Graph 1 shows (a) the number of shares and (b) the value (in U.S. dollars) of the total 
annual trade in Italian ADRs.  It is apparent that there was a dramatic drop in (a) the number 
of shares traded after 1998, while (b) the value of shares traded shows a decline starting 
before 1998.22  We compare the number and the value of shares of Italian companies traded in 
the United States with the total number and the total value of traded shares of Western 
European companies, to test if the significant drop highlighted in Graph 1 is common to all 
Western European countries or if it only occurred for Italian companies.   
We estimate the model: 
98*98 210 AfterValueAfterValueVol ttt βββα +++=  , and                                               (4) 
98*98 210 AfterVolumeAfterVolumeVal ttt βββα +++=                                                 (4b) 
for both Italian and Western European companies.  If the 1998 Draghi reform signals a 
turning point in the historic trends for both the number of ADRs traded in the United States 
market and their value, then we would expect a negative and significant coefficient β2 for the 
                                                 
22
 Source: Citigroup Depositary Receipt Services (http://wwss.citissb.com/adr/scripts/uig/pgm_s.asp).   
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regression including Italian companies, but not for the regression including Western European 
companies.   
 [Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
Our results included in Table 7 show that 1998 is a turning point in the annual data trend for 
both the number and the value of shares of Italian companies traded on United States 
Exchanges. As expected, the interaction coefficient (β2) is, indeed, negative and significant 
for the Italian market data, while the coefficient is not statistically different from zero for the 
Western European market data.   
Based on the above results, we cannot infer a cause-effect relation between the 1998 
Draghi reform and the decline in the number and value of Italian ADRs listed on United 
States stock exchanges.  However, the results conform to the story that our previous data 
indicate: Italian companies cross-listed ADRs in the United States market not to raise equity 
capital, not to deliver higher value to investors or to increase the market value of the 
company, but to signal their quality to the market and to bond themselves to a higher 
shareholder legal protection environment.  Since after the 1998 Draghi reform the quality 
signaling incentive no longer exists, because the domestic market offers a higher protection 
for the minority shareholders, the decision to cross-list ADRs in the United States market is 
less frequent.  
 [Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
  
33 
Second, we compare the number of ADR programs that went active/inactive in the period 
1998 through 2002 vs. 2002 through 2007 for Italian and Western European companies. In 
July 2002 the United States Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which, overall, 
increased the costs of compliance with United States regulations for both United States and 
foreign companies listed on United States stock exchanges.  Because of SOX, previous 
literature found evidence that after 2002 the number of foreign companies seeking to cross-list 
their shares in the United States  market decreased (Zhu et al. 2007).  However, if, as we 
argue in this study, the 1998 Draghi Reform constituted a turning point in the incentives for 
Italian companies to cross-list, then we would expect a decrease in the number of Italian 
companies cross-listing starting in 1998, and not in 2002 as for the rest of the sample.  Indeed, 
as Table 7 shows, we found a 2.6% increase in the number of new Western European ADR 
programs that started between 1998 and 2002, while during the same period Italian ADR 
programs decreased by 11.8% (going from 34 to 30).  Conversely, for the period 2002 – 2007, 
the number of Western European ADR programs decreased by 20.4%, while the number of 
Italian ADR programs stayed constant.23 Again, without providing a cause-effect relation, 
these results are consistent with the other evidence presented in the paper that Italian 
companies cross-list more for quality signaling reasons than for economic or capital raising 
motivations.  
 
 
                                                 
23
 Nine new Italian ADR program started between 2002 and 2007, while six went inactive. However, in August 
2007, the FIAT Group announced its intention to delist its three ADR programs from the NYSE, effective 90 
days from the communication to the SEC (http://www.reuters.com/article/tnBasicIndustries-
SP/idUSN0334245020070803), reducing the number of new active ADR programs for the period to six.  
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6.  Conclusions and future research 
Overall, our results indicate that when shareholder protection is low, cross-listing in 
the United States can serve, and it is effectively used by Italian companies, to bond to a higher 
shareholder protection environment.  Moreover, Italian cross-listed companies (i) decrease the 
amount paid in dividends after the cross-listing, and (ii) increase the cash holding ratio, 
confirming the bonding hypothesis.  However, when a country institutes a corporate 
governance reform that improves minority shareholder protection domestically, this bonding 
motivation to cross-list no longer exists or is greatly reduced.  These results suggest a public 
policy implication that domestic market or government corporate governance reforms can be 
used to reduce companies’ incentives to cross-list.  We further find that, contrary to prior 
research, increasing shareholder value and accessing capital are not significant motivators in 
the decision of Italian firms to cross-list in the United States either before or after the 1998 
corporate governance reform.     
 
6.1 Strengths and Limitations  
This study contributes to the stream of research analyzing the consequences of cross-
listing in the United States market. A key assumption of the paper is that the United States 
legal environment better guarantees minority shareholders’ rights than does the Italian legal 
system. Previous literature provides strong evidence supporting this assumption, as 
highlighted in the theory section above.  
We acknowledge there are certain limitations in this study.  One limitation is that the 
small sample may not provide enough scope to detect differences in actual returns to investors 
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for the two groups of firms (firms that did or did not cross-list in the United States).  This 
limitation, however, would make it less likely to find statistically significant differences in our 
results.  
 
6.2 Implications  
The results of the paper may help firms to better understand the benefits and limitations of 
cross-listing and bonding to an environment offering higher shareholder protection.  The 
focus of the paper, indeed, is on the benefits related to the reduction of the agency costs 
associated with the asymmetry between ownership rights and cash flow rights.  Presently, 
firms know how to compute the costs associated with cross-listing, but they are less able to 
quantify and identify the benefits provided by cross-listing, other than the possibility of 
accessing a more liquid capital market.  This paper also provides governments with some 
evidence that improving corporate governance domestically may prevent companies from 
cross-listing their shares in countries with stronger corporate governance environments. 
  
6.3 Future Research 
It would be interesting to extend the current study to other countries (country by country 
and across multiple countries) to verify whether the different legal environments and different 
corporate governance systems are significant factors in the cross-listing decision, as previous 
theory suggests.  Furthermore, it would also be interesting to analyze and isolate the likely 
different motivations between companies that decide to list their shares on a United States 
organized exchange (NYSE, American Stock Exchange, NASDAQ) – level II and III ADR, -  
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versus companies that decide to expand into the US capital market without registering with 
the SEC – level I ADR - whose shares are traded by Institutional investors in the OTC 
Bulletin Board or Pink Sheet trading system.  
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Table 1 
List of Italian companies with ADRs listed on United States stock exchanges 
Issuer Active Listed Exchange MSCI Industry 
Alitalia - Linee Aeree Italiane, SpA. A 5/18/98 PORTAL Transportation - Airlines 
Banca Commerciale Italiana A 3/10/94 PORTAL Banking 
Banca Popolare di Brescia S.C. A 10/1/97 PORTAL Banking 
Bastogi IRBS A 12/31/86 OTC Real Estate 
Benetton Group SpA A 1/1/87 NYSE Textiles & Apparel 
Bulgari SpA A 7/6/95 PORTAL Recreation, Other Consumer Goods 
Credito Italiano I 12/21/93 PORTAL Banking 
De Rigo SpA I 10/19/95 NYSE Misc. Materials & Commodities 
Ducati Motor Holding SpA A 3/19/99 NYSE Automobiles 
Enel SpA A 3/31/06 NYSE Utilities - Electrical & Gas 
Eni SpA A 12/5/95 NYSE Energy Sources 
Eridania Z.N, SpA A 12/31/86 OTC Food & Household Products 
Esaote Biomedica A 6/20/96 PORTAL Health & Personal Care 
Fiat SpA A 1/1/89 NYSE Automobiles 
Fiat SpA A 1/1/89 NYSE Automobiles 
Fiat SpA A 1/1/89 NYSE Automobiles 
Fila Holding SpA I 6/1/93 NYSE Recreation, Other Consumer Goods 
Gentium SpA A 6/16/05 NASDAQ Chemicals 
Industrie Natuzzi SpA A 5/13/93 NYSE Appliances & Household Durables 
Instituto Mobilaire Italiano SpA I 2/16/94 NYSE Banking 
Instrumentation Laboratory SpA I 10/28/96 NASDAQ Health & Personal Care 
Interpump Group SpA A 6/1/99 PORTAL Machinery & Engineering 
Istituto Bancario San Paolo di Torino, SpA I 6/3/97 PORTAL Banking 
Istituto Nazionale delle Assicurazioni, SpA I 7/6/94 NYSE Insurance 
Italcementi Fabriche Riunite A 6/30/89 OTC Building Materials & Components 
Luxottica Group SpA A 1/1/90 NYSE Health & Personal Care 
Mediaset SpA I 6/30/04 PORTAL Broadcasting & Publishing 
Mediaset SpA A 1/19/05 OTC Broadcasting & Publishing 
Montedison SpA I 1/1/91 NYSE Multi-Industry 
Montedison SpA I 1/1/91 NYSE Multi-Industry 
Olivetti & C. SpA (Ord) A 12/31/86 OTC Data Processing & Reproduction 
Parmalat Finanziaria SpA A 8/9/96 PORTAL Food & Household Products 
Pirelli SpA A 11/12/91 OTC Industrial Components 
SAES Getters SpA I 5/29/96 NASDAQ Misc. Materials & Commodities 
Sanpaolo IMI SpA A 11/1/98 NYSE Banking 
Simint SpA I 6/1/92 OTC Textiles & Apparel 
Simint SpA I 6/1/92 OTC Textiles & Apparel 
SNIA Viscosa A 6/29/89 OTC Multi-Industry 
Societa Italiana Distribuzione Moderna SpA A 6/30/89 OTC Merchandising/Retail 
STET I 7/30/91 PORTAL Telecommunications 
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STET I 12/31/86 OTC Telecommunications 
STET I 7/27/95 NYSE Telecommunications 
STET I 7/27/95 NYSE Telecommunications 
Telecom Italia SpA A 7/27/95 NYSE Telecommunications 
Telecom Italia SpA A 7/27/95 NYSE Telecommunications 
UniCredito SpA (formerly: Credito Italiano) A 12/21/93 PORTAL Banking 
 
This table lists companies with ADRs on the United States markets from 1993 to 2005, based on data 
from the Citigroup Depositary Receipt Services (http://wwss.citissb.com/adr/scripts/uig/pgm_s.asp).  
Different classes of shares of the same company are listed here as different ADR programs (i.e., FIAT 
S.P.A. cross-lists 3 different ADR programs).  Each class of shares assigns to the shareholder different 
voting and cash flow rights (similarly to class A and B shares in the U.S.).   
 
  
41 
Table 2 
Capital Raising Events for Italian ADRs listed on United States stock exchanges 
Issuer Event Date # Of Shares USD Price USD Value 
Alitalia - Linee Aeree Italiane, SpA 5/18/98          4,000        80.85        323,400 
Banca Commerciale Italiana 3/10/94    2,476,200        32.05    79,362,210 
Banca Commerciale Italiana 8/17/94         31,250        19.12        597,500 
Banca Popolare di Brescia S.C. 10/1/97         20,000        28.41        568,200 
Benetton Group SpA 2/1/94    5,500,000        31.41  172,755,000 
Bulgari SpA 7/6/95       770,000          5.32      4,096,400 
Credito Italiano 12/21/93    1,478,000        18.42    27,224,760 
De Rigo SpA 10/19/95    8,900,000        16.00  142,400,000 
Ducati Motor Holding SpA 3/19/99       980,030        31.67    31,037,550 
Enel SpA 11/5/99    3,467,000        45.23  156,803,396 
Eni SpA 12/5/95  26,381,038        32.88  867,408,529 
Eni SpA 10/28/96  14,500,000        46.75  677,875,000 
Eni SpA 7/8/97  13,600,000        56.50  768,400,000 
Eni SpA 7/7/98    3,658,900        63.96  234,023,244 
Esaote Biomedica 6/20/96       190,000        25.19      4,786,100 
Fila Holding SpA 6/1/93    7,500,000        18.00  135,000,000 
Fila Holding SpA 10/27/95    4,837,500        39.00  188,662,500 
Gentium SpA 6/16/05    2,700,000          9.00    24,300,000 
Industrie Natuzzi SpA 5/13/93    9,660,000        15.00  144,900,000 
Industrie Natuzzi SpA 7/20/94    3,080,000        27.38    84,315,000 
Instituto Mobilaire Italiano SpA 2/16/94    6,922,445        19.24  133,187,842 
Instrumentation Laboratory SpA 10/28/96    5,264,889        12.00    63,178,668 
Instrumentation Laboratory SpA 6/16/98    6,585,390          1.42      9,351,254 
Istituto Bancario San Paolo di Torino, SpA. 6/3/97         33,769        25.51        861,447 
Istituto Nazionale Delle Assicurazioni, SpA 7/6/94    9,227,300        15.25  140,716,325 
Mediaset SpA 7/12/96       367,000        45.75    16,790,250 
SAES Getters SpA 5/21/96    3,082,476        17.00    52,402,092 
STET 7/30/91                 -             -      55,000,000
Telecom Italia SpA 10/29/97    5,000,000        64.68  323,400,000 
Total    4,539,726,667
 
This table lists companies with capital raising events from 1993 to 2005 on the United States markets, 
based on data from the Citigroup Depositary Receipt Services 
(http://wwss.citissb.com/adr/scripts/uig/pgm_s.asp).   
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Overall Sample ADR Sample 
  
No ADR Sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
SalesEU 2299 2,990,000,000 8,750,000,000 171 12,800,000,000 19,600,000,000 2127 2,210,000,000 6,610,000,000 
NetIncEU 2298 66,700,000 628,000,000 171 145,000,000 1,810,000,000 2127 60,400,000 405,000,000 
CaEU 2341 2,300,000,000 7,430,000,000 173 9,730,000,000 17,500,000,000 2168 1,700,000,000 5,530,000,000 
GoodEU 2293 399,000,000 2,440,000,000 170 1,880,000,000 6,160,000,000 2123 280,000,000 1,790,000,000 
RetEarEU 2290 97,800,000 715,000,000 170 258,000,000 1,490,000,000 2120 85,000,000 611,000,000 
Growth 2041 0.4450 8.1244 166 0.1183 0.6449 1875 0.4739 8.4738 
MktVal 2119 1,490,000,000 6,380,000,000 169 5,020,000,000 13,700,000,000 1950 1,180,000,000 5,190,000,000 
MktValAdj 1365 1,460,000,000 6,280,000,000   NA NA   NA  NA 
TobinQ 2296 1.5007 13.3931 171 1.2210 0.7393 2125 1.5232 13.9200 
TobinQQ 1352 1.0382 0.4880   NA NA   NA NA 
CrossListUS 2345 0.0738 0.2615 173 1.0000 0.0000 2172 0.0000 0.0000 
After98 2346 0.7123 0.4528 173 0.7399 0.4400 2172 0.7099 0.4539 
CrossListUSAfter 2345 0.0546 0.2272 173 0.7399 0.4400 2172 0.0000 0.0000 
Divratio 2053 0.0079 0.0180 166 0.0052 0.0117 1887 0.0081 0.0184 
LogCashRatio 2271 -7.7716 1.9704 171 -6.5998 2.0986 2100 -7.8670 1.9290 
DiffShare 1283 -1.6845 574.0340   NA NA   NA NA 
Retwithout 2089 0.1671 1.3715 164 0.2829 1.2667 1925 0.1572 1.3800 
Variables definition: SalesEU is total sales in euro.  NetIncEU is net income in euro.  CaEU is current assets in euro.  GoodEU is goodwill in euro.  RetEarEU is 
retained earnings in euro.  Growth is calculated as the increase in sales between year t-1 and t, divided total sales for year t-1.  MktVal is equal to total shares 
outstanding times the price of a share at the end of the year (in euro).  MktValAdj is market value adjusted (total shares outstanding adjusted for cross split/reverse split 
times price per share adjusted for emission of new shares/merges at the end of the year in euro).  TobinQ is equal to the market value of assets divided by the book 
value of total assets: market value of assets is calculated as the book value of assets plus the market value of common stock (total shares outstanding  multiplied by the 
price per share outstanding) less the sum of book value of common equity.  TobinQQ is calculated as the TobinQ variable, but using the adjusted values for prices and 
number of shares outstanding.  CrossListUS is a binary variable equal to 1 if shares of the company are listed on a United States stock exchange, 0 otherwise.  After98 
is a binary variable equal to 1 if the year is 1998 or after, zero otherwise.  CrossListUSAfter is the interaction term between After98 and CrossListUS, it is equal to one 
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for the companies with ADRs listed in a United States stock exchange after 1998, zero otherwise.  Divratio is dividend ratio, calculated as the ratio of total dividend 
payments to total asset.  LogCashRatio is the log of the ratio of total cash to total assets minus cash.  Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets.  DiffShare is 
equal to the increase/decrease in shares outstanding (adjusted value) between year t-1 and year t.  Retwithout is the return to investors without dividends (computed as 
Retwithout=(Pt-Pt-1)-1.  NA indicates that we did not calculate or analyze these values as part of this paper. 
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Table 4 
Panel A: Correlation Table 
 DivRatio NetIncEU Growth CrossListUSAfter CaEU GoodEU RetEarEU MktVal TobinQ 
DivRatio 1         
NetIncEU 0.134 1        
Growth -0.013 0.003 1       
CrossListUS  -0.045 0.074 -0.009 1      
CaEU -0.057 0.078 0.039 0.286 1     
GoodEU -0.041 0.202 0.230 0.171 0.366 1    
RetEarEU 0.192 0.446 -0.004 0.065 0.155 0.078 1   
MktVal 0.218 0.629 0.070 0.164 0.256 0.272 0.523 1  
TobinQ 0.166 0.043 0.049 -0.008 -0.063 -0.028 0.035 0.208 1 
 
Panel B: Collinearity Diagnostics Table 
Variable VIF Square VIF Tolerance Squared 
DivRatio 1.10 1.05 0.9104 0.0896 
NetincEU 1.78 1.33 0.5626 0.4374 
Growth 1.07 1.03 0.9358 0.0642 
CrosslistUS 1.11 1.05 0.901  0.0981 
CaEU 1.31 1.14 0.7645 0.2355 
GoodEU  1.30 1.14 0.7673 0.2327 
RetEarEU 1.46 1.21 0.6828 0.3172 
MktVal  2.25 1.50 0.4441 0.5559 
TobinQ 1.10 1.05 0.9059 0.0941 
Mean VIF 1.39    
 
Variables definition: Divratio is dividend ratio, calculated as the ratio of total dividend payments to total 
assets.  NetIncEU is net income in euro.  Growth is calculated as increase in sales between year t-1 and t, 
divided total sales for year t-1.  CrossListUS is a binary variable equal to 1 if shares of the company are 
listed on a United States stock exchange, 0 otherwise.  After98 is a binary variable equal to 1 if the year is 
1998 or after, zero otherwise.  CaEU is current assets in euro.  GoodEU is goodwill in euro.  RetEarEU is 
retained earnings in euro.  MktVal is equal to total shares outstanding times the price per share on the 
market at the end of the year (in euro).  TobinQ is equal to the market value of assets divided by the book 
value of total assets: market value of assets is calculated as the book value of assets plus the market value 
of common stock (total shares outstanding  multiplied by price per share outstanding) less the sum of book 
value of common equity.  CrossListUSAfter is the interaction term between After98 and CrossListUS, it is 
equal to one for the companies with ADRs listed in a Unites States stock exchange after 1998, zero 
otherwise.  
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Table 5 
Panel A: Univariate results comparing before/after the 1998 reform 
 
Hypotheses 
Before 98 
Mean 
After 98 
Mean 
t value 
(p value) 
Before 98 
Median 
After 98 
Median 
Pearson 
chi2 + 
(p value) 
1. Div. Ratio 0.00865 0.00543 -3.4484 
(.0003) 
0.01199 * 0.01351 * 3.4892 
(0.062) 
2. Log Cash Ratio -7.32148 -7.94287 6.7818 
(0.000) 
-7.60997 -8.12423 27.8002  
(0.000) 
3. Retwithout 0.22112 0.14647 1.1118 
(0.1332) 
-0.00084 * 0.01992 * 1.2287 
(0.268) 
4. TobinQ ♦ 0.98175 1.31346 -6.2010 
(0.000) 
0.89504 1.05569 129.0449 
(0.000) 
5. Diff Share • -73.00248 38.31250 -3.3459 
(0.0004) 
0.0085 * 0.2275 * 4.3212 
(0.038) 
*
 : Because the median value for both groups is equal to zero, we calculate the median values presented in 
this table excluding zero. 
+ : We obtain Pearson chi square values by splitting equally between the two groups the values equal to the 
median. 
♦ : We omit the outliers with TobinQ values larger than 600.  We obtain qualitatively the same results 
winsorizing the variable TobinQ to account for outliers (.9787 vs. 1.2623 means, t value of –8.7208, p-
value of  0.000).  
• : Calculated using the adjusted price and share sample.   
 
Panel B: Univariate results comparing cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms 
Hypotheses 
ADRs 
Mean 
Non ADRs 
Mean 
t value 
(p value) 
ADRs 
Median 
Non ADRs 
Median 
Pearson 
chi2+ 
(p value) 
1. Div. Ratio 0.005189 
 
0.00813 2.0203  
(0.0217) 
0.00931 * 0.13510 * 0.0133 
(0.908) 
2. Log Cash 
Ratio 
-6.59984 -7.86700 -8.2042 
(0.000) 
-7.08553 -8.03719 30.1750 
(0.000) 
3. Retwithout 0.15718 .28292 -1.1271 
(0.1299) 
-0.00190 * 0.01735  0.4722 
(0.492) 
4. TobinQ ♦ 1.22103 1.22236 0.0145 
(0.5058) 
0.99230 0.98877 0.0063 
(0.937) 
5. Diff Share • 127.5499 -16.50553 -2.7378 
(0.0031) 
0.27976 * 0.09700 * 9.0853 
(0.003) 
*
 : Because the median value for both groups is equal to zero, we calculate the median values presented in this table 
excluding zero. 
+  : We obtain Pearson chi square values by splitting equally between the two groups the values equal to the median. 
♦ : We omit the outliers with TobinQ values larger than 600.  We obtain qualitatively the same results winsorizing 
the variable TobinQ to account for outliers (.9787 vs. 1.2623 means, t value of –8.7208, p-value of  0.000).  
•  : Calculated using the adjusted price and share sample.   
Variables definition: see Table 3 above 
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Table 6 
OLS Regressions  
AfterSCrossListUSCrossListUTobinQMktValtEarEU
GoodEUCaEUAfterGrowthNetIncEUDependent
*Re
98
98765
43210
βββββ
βββββα
++++
++++++=
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dep Variable Divratio LogCashRatio Leverage TobinQ Retwithout MktVal Diffshare 
NetIncEU 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 6.923 -0.000 
 
(1.63) (3.02)** (3.06)** (3.21)** (2.45)* (7.12)** (1.76) 
Growth -0.000 -0.004 -0.000 0.001 0.001 19176649.424 13.956 
 
(0.61) (1.23) (1.17) (0.46) (2.60)** (1.38) (9.99)** 
After98 0.001 -0.447 -0.010 0.286 -0.286 56392115.926 -40.129 
 
(0.56) (3.16)** (0.74) (8.25)** (1.68) (0.32) (1.94)* 
CaEU -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.166 -0.000 
 
(3.08)** (0.62) (11.81)** (6.52)** (1.07) (3.39)** (0.82) 
GoodEU -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.489 0.000 
 
(0.50) (0.12) (1.73) (3.62)** (0.83) (2.58)** (2.19)* 
RetEarEU 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 1.057 -0.000 
 
(0.91) (1.26) (1.97)* (2.64)** (1.71) (2.04)* (0.34) 
MktVal -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000  0.000 
 
(0.62) (1.12) (1.02) (4.75)** (1.25)  (1.26) 
TobinQ 0.004 0.126 -0.046  0.168 1.184e+09 37.675 
 
(4.42)** (1.38) (5.65)**  (2.63)** (6.24)** (1.31) 
CrossListUS -0.006 1.657 -0.029 0.393 -0.204 4.518e+08 -14.555 
 
(2.80)** (3.52)** (0.85) (1.64) (1.07) (0.68) (0.40) 
CrossListUS*After98 0.004 -0.437 0.034 -0.400 0.303 1.197e+09 -24.931 
 
(1.40) (0.83) (0.92) (1.57) (1.41) (1.29) (0.34) 
Constant 0.003 -7.791 0.683 1.106 0.146 -1.252e+09 -5.312 
 
(2.11)* (47.33)** (43.55)** (39.09)** (0.70) (4.68)** (0.15) 
Observations 1407 1391 1407 1407 1316 1407 1383 
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R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.02 0.67 0.22 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Variables definition: Dependent, the dependent variable, is equal to Divratio in column (1), LogCashRatio in column (2), Leverage in column (3), TobinQ in 
column (4), Retwithout in column (5), MktVal in column (6), and Diffshare in column (7).  Divratio is dividend ratio, calculated as the ratio of total dividend 
payments to total assets.  LogCashRatio is the log of the ratio of total cash to total assets minus cash.  Leverage is calculated as total liabilities divided by total 
assets.  TobinQ is equal to the market value of assets divided by the book value of total assets: market value of assets is calculated as the book value of assets 
plus the market value of common stock (total shares outstanding multiplied by the price per share outstanding) less the sum of book value of common equity, 
winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. Untabulated results show qualitatively similar results for value of TobinQ non-winsorized.  RetWithout is the return to 
investors without dividends (computed as Retwithout=(Pt-Pt-1)-1.  Untabulated results show qualitatively similar results if we adopt returns to investors including 
dividends.  Diffshare is the difference in the number of shares outstanding between year t and year t-1 for company i.  NetIncEU is net income in euro.  Growth 
is calculated as increase in sales between year t-1 and t, divided total sales for year t-1.  After98 is a binary variable equal to 1 if the year is 1998 or after 1998, 
zero otherwise.  CaEU is current assets in euro.  GoodEU is goodwill in euro.  RetEarEU is retained earnings in euro.  MktVal is equal to total shares 
outstanding times the price per share on the market at the end of the year (in euro).  TobinQ is equal to the market value of assets divided by the book value of 
total assets: market value of assets is calculated as the book value of assets plus the market value of common stock (total shares outstanding multiplied by the 
price per share outstanding) less the sum of book value of common equity, windsorized at the top and bottom 1% to control for outliers.  CrossListUS is a 
indicator variable equal to 1 if shares of the company are cross-listed for the year on a United States stock exchange, 0 otherwise.  The standard errors/t-statistics 
are calculated adopting the White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity adjustment.   
 
Columns (1) and (2) provide results for the first hypothesis in the paper, Column (3) shows results testing if companies after cross-listing and/or the 1998 reform 
changed their financing habits, switching from equity to debt or vice-versa.  Columns (4) and (5) show the results for the model testing the second hypothesis of 
the paper.  Untabulated results provide qualitative similar results adopting as a dependent variable the non-windsorized value of TobinQ or the return to investors 
including dividends.  Finally, Columns (5) and (6) show results for the model testing the third hypothesis in the paper.  
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Table 7 
Number of shares vs. Value of Italian/Western European ADR exchange in the US, 1991-2005 
 
a) 98*98 210 AfterValueAfterValueVol ttt βββα +++=  and  
b) 98*98 210 AfterVolumeAfterVolumeVal ttt βββα +++=  
 
 (1) 
Value Italy 
(2) 
Volume Italy 
(3) 
Value W Europe 
(4) 
Volume W Europe 
After98 4.381e+09 97082814.313 2.550e+11 1.080e+10 
 
(2.07) (2.18) (1.09) (2.90)* 
Vol Italy 38.371    
 
(7.47)**    
Vol Italy*After98 -35.724    
 
(2.14)*    
Value Italy  0.024   
 
 (7.46)**   
Value Italy*After98  -0.022   
 
 (2.12)*   
Vol W Europe   46.598  
 
  (2.72)*  
Vol W Europe*After98   -29.817  
 
  (1.40)  
Value W Europe    0.020 
 
   (2.49)* 
Value W Europe*After98    -0.011 
 
   (1.11) 
Constant -5.818e+08 21453938.292 -5.514e+10 1.485e+09 
 
(0.96) (1.61) (0.52) (0.77) 
Observations 15 15 15 15 
R-squared 0.85 0.85 0.75 0.89 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
 
Where: After98 is a indicator variable equal to 1 for years after 1998, 0 otherwise.  Vol Italy is the total number of ADRs 
exchanged annually on United States stock exchanges.  Value Italy is the value (number times the price per share) of Italian 
ADRs exchanged annually on United States stock exchanges.  Vol W Europe is the total number of ADRs for Western 
European companies exchanged annually on United States stock exchanges.  Value W Europe is the value of Western 
European ADRs exchanged annually on United States stock exchanges.  Column (1) reports results for the OLS estimation of 
Model b for Italy;  Column (2) reports results for the OLS estimation of Model a for Italy; Column (3) reports the OLS 
estimation of Model b for Western Europe;  and Column (4) reports results for the OLS estimation of Model a for Western 
Europe.  
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Table 8 
Number of ADR Programs for Italy and Western Europe for the periods 1998-2002 and 2003-2007 
  
 # of 
ADR 
1997 
# of ADR 
went inactive 
1998- 2002 
# of ADR 
went active 
1998-2002 
Total  % 
change 
# of ADR 
went inactive 
2003-2007 
# of ADR 
went active 
2003-2007 
Total at the 
end of 2007 
% change 
compared 
with 2002 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
W Europe 768 280 300 788 +2.6% 280 119 627 -20.4% 
Italy 34 8 4 30 -11.8% 6 9 – Fiat 324  30 0% 
 
Column (1) shows the number of ADR programs from Western Europe and Italy, respectively, at the end of 1997. Column (2) shows the number of ADR 
programs that went inactive during the period 1998-2002, and Column (3) the number of ADR programs that went active over the same period. Column (4) 
presents the total number of ADR programs at the end of December, 2002, and Column (5) the % variation.  Similarly, the rest of the table provides information 
about the number of ADR programs that went inactive (Column 6) and active (Column 7) between 2003 and 2007 for both Western European and Italian 
companies, with the total at the end of October, 2007 (Column 8) and the % variation (Column 9).  
 
Source: Citibank ADR Website, data at Oct. 18, 2007. 
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 Nine new Italian ADR program started between 2002 and 2007, while six went inactive. However, in August 2007, the FIAT Group announced its intention to 
delist its three ADR programs from the NYSE, effective 90 days from the communication to the SEC (http://www.reuters.com/article/tnBasicIndustries-
SP/idUSN0334245020070803), reducing  the number of new active ADR programs for the period to six. 
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Graph 1 
Time series trading data  
Number of shares and value of share in $ of Italian ADRs listed on United States stock exchanges 
 
 
These graphs include the total number of shares and value (in U.S. $) of Italian ADRs exchanged in the United States 
markets each year from 1991 to 2005. Source: Citigroup Depositary Receipt Services 
(http://wwss.citissb.com/adr/scripts/uig/pgm_s.asp).   
 
 
 
 
